Relationship Between Noninterest Income and Bank Valuation: Evidence from the U.S. Bank Holding Companies by Li, Mingqi & Feng, Tiananqi
 1 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NONINTEREST INCOME AND BANK 
VALUATION: 
EVIDENCE FORM THE U.S. BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 
by 
Mingqi Li 
B.Comm., Saint Mary’s University, 2015 
and 
Tiananqi Feng 
B.Econ., Jinan University, 2015 
 
 
PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN FINANCE 
of the 
Faculty 
of 
Business Administration 
 Mingqi Li and Tiananqi Feng  
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY  
Fall 2016 
 
 2 
Approval 
Name: Mingqi Li and Tiananqi Feng 
Degree: Master of Science in Finance 
Title: Relationship between Noninterest Income and Bank 
Valuation: Evidence from the U.S. Bank Holding 
Companies 
 
 
Supervisory Committee: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jijun Niu 
Senior Supervisor 
Associate Professor, Finance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ying Duan 
Second Reader 
Assistant Professor, Finance 
 
 
Date Approved: 
 
 
  
 3 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of noninterest income on bank valuation using 625 U.S. Bank 
Holding Companies over the period 2003-2015. We use two measures of valuation: Tobin’s q 
and the market-to-book ratio. Using the whole sample, we find a positive relation between 
noninterest income and valuation. We then divide banks in our sample into three groups based on 
size, and the sample period into three sub-periods. We find that noninterest income is positively 
related to valuation (1) for large banks in each sub-period, (2) for medium-sized banks during 
and after the financial crisis of 2007-2009, and (3) for small banks after the financial crisis.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the past three decades, U.S. banks have drifted from generating revenue through traditional 
loan-making activities to generating revenue through nontraditional activities such as fiduciary 
activities, service charges, and trading revenue. Figure 1 shows that noninterest income as a 
share of net operating revenue has increased dramatically from 10% in 1984 to 35% in 2015, 
indicating that noninterest income has become increasingly important for banks. 
 
Figure 1: Noninterest Income as a Share of Net Operating Revenue 
Source: FDIC 
Note: Net operating revenue is the sum of noninterest income and net interest income.  
 
 
Noninterest income has not only increased bank revenue, but also reduced its volatility. Figure 2 
shows that the growth of noninterest income was more steady than that of interest income over 
the last three decades. In particular, during the financial crisis of 2007-2009, noninterest income 
was more stable than interest income. While interest income dropped by 25%, noninterest 
income increased by 12% during the crisis period. After the crisis, noninterest income is 
negatively correlated with interest income. Therefore, noninterest income reduces the volatility 
of bank revenue, especially during the recent financial crisis. 
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Figure 2: Trends in noninterest income vs interest income 
 
 
Source: FDIC 
Note: Shaded areas are before, during and after the financial crisis 
 
 
It is important for banks to reduce risk through noninterest income during a crisis. Indeed, 
because noninterest income reduces the volatility of bank revenue, it is reasonable for regulators 
to reduce capital requirements for banks which rely more on noninterest income. Banks would 
then have an incentive to reduce risk by generating more noninterest income because lower 
capital requirements usually mean lower cost of capital. 
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Figure 3: Yearly Noninterest Income, % of Average Assets 
 
 
Source: FDIC 
Note: Shaded areas are before, during and after the financial crisis 
 
 
As for the impact of bank sizes on noninterest income, the trend shows that the ratio of 
noninterest income to the average assets in all banks is converging together after the recent 
financial crisis of 2007-2009. Large banks with assets more than $10 billion show an increasing 
trend of noninterest income to the average assets before the crisis whereas the ratio decreases 
during and after the crisis. The possible reason could be that the increasing assets dilute the ratio. 
Medium-sized banks with assets between $1 billion and $10 billion show the same pattern as that 
at large banks. Small banks with assets up to $1 billion, show an increasing trend after the crisis.  
 
In this paper, we study the impact of noninterest income on bank valuation. Because noninterest 
income reduces the volatility of bank revenue, we hypothesize that banks with higher noninterest 
income have a higher valuation. By focusing on valuation rather than profitability, we avoid 
some of the problems of measuring bank performance using profitability. Following previous 
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studies such as Gambacorta, Scatigna, and Yang (2014), we use the ratio of noninterest income 
to total operating income to measure the importance of noninterest income for a given bank. We 
use Tobin’s q and the market-to-book ratio as measures of valuation. Our sample consists of U.S. 
bank holding companies from 2003 to 2015. We include a variety of control variables such as 
bank size, capital ratio, loans to assets ratio, deposits to assets ratio and return on equity in the 
regressions. 
 
To take a close look at the impact of noninterest income on bank valuation under different 
market conditions, we divide the sample period into three sub-periods: before, during, and after 
the financial crisis of 2007-2009. We also divide banks in our sample into three groups based on 
size. We find that noninterest income is positively related to valuation (1) for large banks in each 
sub-period, (2) for medium-sized banks during and after the financial crisis of 2007-2009, and (3) 
for small banks after the financial crisis. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review. Section 3 
presents data and methodology. Section 4 presents empirical results. Section 5 concludes the 
work. 
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2. Literature Overview 
 
A few literature has studied the relation between bank diversification and valuation. We mainly 
summarized the empirical results from studies of the relationship between income diversification 
and bank valuation in U.S. and international wise. Early studies mostly find a negative 
relationship between the banks’ income diversification and bank value; while the recent studies 
show positive relationship between banks’ income diversification and bank value. Lastly, a latest 
study has been studied in 2014 based on bank sizes and geographical locations, which adds new 
findings to the empirical studies. 
 
In the earlier studies, Lang and Stulz (1994) find that Tobin's q and firm diversification have a 
negative relation based on the data from the 1980s in U.S. Firms that choose to diversify have 
poor performance compared to the firms that do not diversify, but there is no significant evidence 
that they have lower Tobin’s q than the average firm in their industry. The reason is that large 
financial firms may be inefficient in establishing managerial incentive contracts and it may also 
be difficult to align the incentives of outsiders and insiders for large financial firms (Rotemberg 
and Saloner, 1994). With the same result, Berger and Ofek (1995) and Servaes (1996) find a 
diversification discount that Tobin's q of diversified firms is lower than that of specialized firms.  
Meanwhile, works by Jensen (1996) suggest that diversification of activities within a single bank 
may intensify agency problems. Interestingly, Berger and Humphrey (1997) argue that since it is 
difficult to price different activities, it is very difficult to identify the presence of economies of 
scale in financial services.  
 
However, Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) find that less productive firms tend to diversify, but 
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diversification does not induce lower productivity based on the plant-level data from US 
manufacturing firms. Campa and Kedia (2002) find that the failure to control firms’ endogenous 
characteristics that lead firm’s diversification will induce discount in firm values. For example, a 
poor performing firm will trade at a discount to compete with other firms in the industry. Since 
they have lower opportunity costs than the other competitors of allocating its resources in other 
industries, they will generate diversification. Graham et al. (2002) argue that firms tend to 
purchase the target firms with discount, resulting in producing the diversification discount. Thus, 
they argue that no evidence shows that diversification exaggerates agency problems and destroys 
bank value. 
 
Villalonga (2004a) argues that the main drivers of the entire diversification literature are data 
problems. After identifying shortcomings with the industrial segment data from Compustat 
arising from the fact that firms self-report their activities, she argues that self-reporting biases the 
results toward finding a diversification discount. Most importantly, she highlights the problem 
that each firm can manipulate the way to aggregate specific activities into the broad segments in 
Compustat. About 25% of the changes in firms’ number of segments over time are purely due to 
reporting changes rather than real changes in diversification. She finds a diversification premium 
by applying data at the establishment level. Consequently, a proper examination of the impact of 
diversification must attribute to mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and problems associated with 
self-reported data.  
 
Based on Lang and Stulz (1994)’s ‘chop shop’ method, Laeven and Levine (2007) modify their 
model to examine the impact of diversification on bank value based on the data of 836 banks in 
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43 countries from 1998-2002. They compare the market-to-book ratio of a diversified financial 
institution with that of a corresponding portfolio of selected banks focusing on either interest-
based or fee-based business. Based on the assumption of a linear relationship between 
diversification and market value, they find that diversification decreases market-to-book ratio by 
up to 10 percentage points. Their results are consistent with the earlier studies that diversification 
magnifies agency problems in financial firms with adverse implications for market valuations. 
Schmid and Walter (2009) report findings similar to those of Laeven and Levine (2007) after 
applying the same approach to a large sample of US financial firms including shadow banks.  
 
On the contrary, by applying a longer time period than studies from 1998-2008 and more 
concentration on 2/3 banks in the U.S., Elsas et al. (2010) find that revenue diversification 
increases bank profitability and consequently also market valuations. Revenue diversification 
boosts bank profitability via the higher margins from non-interest businesses and lower cost-
income ratios. A higher bank profitability translates into a higher market valuation, which 
suggests that diversification has an indirect positive impact on bank value, and thus generates a 
diversification premium in banking. Rather than reducing shareholder value, diversification 
improves bank profitability and thus indirectly enhances value. They show that the discrepancy 
of their results with those of Laeven and Levine (2007) is primarily driven by the fact that 
Laeven and Levine (2007) use different measures for bank value and revenue diversification, and 
fail to control for profitability in their major regressions. Moreover, they also find supporting 
evidence that diversification in principle can help banks to better resist shocks during the 
financial crisis. In addition, in the context of international evidence Chen and Lin (2009) find 
that income diversification enhances the bank’s valuation by using market valuation of the bank 
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based on the Laeven and Levine (2007) methodology from the data on 864 banks from 54 
countries during 1992-2006. They also indicate that different samples of banks and changing 
time horizons affect diversification discount. 
 
Since previous studies have shown that it is very difficult to identify the causal impact of 
diversity on the valuation of banks, Armstrong and Fic (2014) conduct an analysis based on bank 
size and geographical locations. After dividing banks into small, medium and large banks, the 
authors find that diversification may add value in small banks but probably destroys it in the 
largest banks. After allocating the banks based on the geographical locations, the authors find 
that European, Asian and North American banks may not gain as much benefit as South 
American and Australian banks at greater diversification of their operations. 
 
3. Data and Methodology  
 
3.1 Sample and Variables 
 
This paper uses panel data from 625 U.S. Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) over the period of 
2003 to 2015. We draw the stock data from the Center for Research in Security Pries (CRSP) 
derived from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The Federal Reserve’s Y-9C reports 
provide the yearly accounting data of U.S. BHCs. We eliminate bank-years that have missing 
data and winsorize all of the variables at the first and ninety-ninth percentile to alleviate the 
effect of extreme outliers. We include year fixed effect in the regression models to control for 
common factors that affect the valuations of all the banks in a given year. 
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To measure the importance of revenue from nontraditional activities, we use the ratio of 
noninterest income to total operating income. We use Tobin’s q and the market-to-book ratio as 
measures of valuation. We include a variety of control variables such as bank size, capital ratio, 
loans to assets ratio, deposits to assets ratio and return on equity, which are used by shareholders 
and investors to assess the values of banks.  
 
Table 1 presents the definition of each variable we use in this paper. Table 2 lists the total 
number of banks in each year in our sample. 
 
As shown by Lang and Stulz (1994), Tobin’s q measures the present value of future cash flow 
divided by the replacement cost of tangible assets and is regarded as a measure of firm valuation. 
We calculate Tobin’s q as the ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities 
to the book value of assets. A similar measure we use is the market-to-book ratio (Caprio, 
Laeven, and Levine, 2007), which is expressed as the ratio of the market value of equity to the 
book value of equity and is used to contrast the market value of a stock to its book value. 
 
We use the ratio of noninterest income to total operating income as the independent variable to 
test its impact on bank valuation.1 Following Stiroh (2004a) and Lepetit et al. (2008), total 
operating income is the sum of interest income and noninterest income. Interest income mainly 
comes from loans and leases and investment securities. Noninterest income mainly comes from 
                                                 
1 Lang and Stulz (1994) use Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as a measure of diversification. Laeven 
and Levine (2007) and Chen and Lin (2009) use the difference between net interest income and 
other operating income as a percentage of total operating income to measure the importance of 
noninterest income. Gambacorta, Scatigna, and Yang (2014) use noninterest income (trading 
income, fees and commissions for services) to total income. 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fees of fiduciary activities, service charges, and trading revenue. 
 
We include a variety of control variables. Firstly, we take the logarithm of total assets of each 
bank in thousands of U.S. dollars to control for the size, which is regarded to affect valuations 
through the economies of scope by Lang and Stulz (1994). Secondly, we include the ratio of 
equity to total assets as a measure of bank leverage level and we use the ratio of pre-tax profit to 
equity as a measure of profitability. Thirdly, we control for the ratio of total deposits to total 
assets to examine whether a higher ratio signals a higher value because deposits are regarded as a 
cheaper source of funding. Fourthly, we also control for the ratio of net loans to total assets. 
 
3.2 Model Chosen 
 
The following equations describe the models that we apply in our analysis. The definitions of 
variables we use in the regressions are listed in Table 1: 
- Dependent variables: Tobin’s q (q) and the market-to-book (mb) ratio 
- Independent variable: The ratio of noninterest income to total operating income (Nii) 
- Control variables: Size, Capital, Loans, Deposits and Return on equity (ROE)  
 
qi,t=  α +β1 Niii,t +β2 Sizei,t +β3 Capitali,t + β4 Loansi,t +β5 Depositsi,t + β6 ROEi,t + εi, 
 
mbi,t= α +β1 Niii,t +β2 Sizei,t +β3 Capitali,t + β4 Loansi,t +β5 Depositsi,t + β6 ROEi,t + εi,t  
 
where i indicates a bank (i = 1, 2, 3, ……, 625); t indicates a year (t = 2003, ……, 2015); β is a 
coefficient to be estimated; α is constant term and ε is the error term.  
 18 
4. Empirical Result  
 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
 
As shown in Table 3, we give summary statistics for the variables after dividing banks in our 
sample into three groups based on total assets: large banks with total assets exceeding $10 
billion, medium-sized banks with total assets between $1 billion and $10 billion and small banks 
with total assets up to $1 billion. The number of observations is 687 for large banks, 2,257 for 
medium-sized banks, and 1,364 for small banks. 
 
Both Tobin’s q and the market-to-book ratio measure the market value of a firm relative to its 
accounting value, in terms of assets and equity, respectively. Generally, a firm’s market value 
diverges from its book value. One main reason is that the market value is a forward-looking 
metric and book value is primarily based on historical performance of a company. The value of a 
bank changes as time varies. Many factors can affect the value of a company including 
macroeconomic and microeconomic factors, and noninterest income is a contribution to the 
changes in the bank value. In this paper, we investigate how changes in the noninterest income 
impact bank valuation.  
 
We find that large banks have a higher average Tobin’s q of 1.05 and a higher market-to-book 
ratio of 1.552, whereas medium-sized and small banks have a lower average Tobin’s q of 1.044 
and 1.036, and a lower market-to-book ratio of 1.468 and 1.405, respectively. In our sample, all 
the value measures are greater than one on average, indicating that the bank’s market value 
exceeds its book value. The standard deviation of the market-to-book ratio is around 70% - 80%, 
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which means that the market-to-book ratio of banks varies considerably across banks and time as 
compared with that of about 6% - 8% for Tobin’s q. Generally, the standard deviation of the 
value measures increases as bank size increases. Indeed, small banks have the lowest standard 
deviations of Tobin’s q and the market-to-book ratio indicating that they have more stable 
valuations. 
 
We use the ratio of noninterest income to total operating income, denoted by Nii, to investigate 
how noninterest income affects bank valuation. We find that large banks have the largest Nii of 
0.315, which is almost twice as much as that of medium-sized banks of 0.176 and small banks of 
0.149. This ratio indicates that large banks have the highest noninterest income ratio over the 
period of 2003 – 2015 because large banks have the economies of scale and the expertise and 
experience of generating noninterest income through nontraditional activities. The standard 
deviation of Nii for large banks is 18%, approximately twice as much as that of small banks, 
showing that Nii varies wider across large banks.  
 
We find that large banks use more leverage, expressed as the ratio of equity to total assets, and 
their profitability in terms of ROE are higher than that of medium-sized and small banks. In 
comparison to medium-sized and small banks, the results of our studies show that large banks 
have lower ratios of net loans to total assets and deposits to total assets. This is consistent with 
that large banks have higher Nii, which comprises of more nontraditional activities. 
 
We summarize how the importance of noninterest income has increased over time for banks of 
different sizes. All banks lose some noninterest income when the market faces with the financial 
 20 
crisis and then gain back the noninterest income after the crisis regardless of bank sizes. Before 
the crisis, large banks have the largest ratio of noninterest income to total operating income with 
0.314, whereas the ratio at medium-sized and small banks is 0.173 and 0.154 respectively. 
During the crisis, the ratio at small and large banks drops by 18% and 17% respectively, while 
the ratio drops only by 10% at medium-sized banks. This could be explained by the truth that the 
small banks are most vulnerable to the crisis and large banks have much more exposure to risks 
due to the large amount of assets. After the crisis, the ratio increases by 24% at both small and 
medium-sized banks and increases by 32% at large banks. Therefore, the ratio at medium-sized 
banks has less volatility than small and large banks in three sub-periods and the ratio at large 
banks is the most sensitive to the changes of the market condition. 
 
4.2 Regression Results 
 
Our model uses linear regression method. For robustness, we divide our sample into three sub-
periods: before the financial crisis (2003 – 2006), during the financial crisis (2007 – 2009) and 
after the financial crisis (2010 – 2015), based on Berger and Bouwman (2013) definition of the 
financial crisis period. We are then able to examine how different market conditions affect the 
relation between noninterest income and bank valuation. Laeven and Levine (2007) indicate that 
size often impacts valuation through the economies of scope. Thus, we divide banks in our 
sample into three groups as stated above. This gives us a picture on how bank size influences the 
relation between noninterest income and bank valuation. 
 
Our regression results are shown in Table 4 to Table 10. In each table, we report the standard 
errors in parentheses and use the 1%, 5% or 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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In Table 4, we regress Tobin’s q and the market-to-book ratio, respectively, on noninterest 
income using the whole sample. The results indicate a positive relation between noninterest 
income and valuation. This finding shows that an increase in noninterest income is associated 
with a higher bank valuation. 
 
When analyzing control variables, we find that the coefficient on bank size is significant and 
positive at the 1% significance level. This result is consistent with Laeven and Levin’s (2007) 
finding that the size of banks often impacts bank valuations through their economies of scale. 
Deposits and return on equity are positively associated with both Tobin’s q and the market-to-
book ratio. The coefficient on capital is positive on the market-to-book valuation. The loans are 
insignificant for both market value measures. 
 
Following Armstrong and Fic (2014), we divide banks into different size groups and sample 
period into sub-periods as noted above. We do so to check whether the positive relation between 
noninterest income and bank valuation exists under different market conditions. 
 
Using Tobin’s q as the dependent variable, Table 5, 6 and 7 present the regression results for 
large, medium-sized and small banks under three sub-periods, respectively. We find that 
noninterest income is always positively associated with valuation at large banks; this relation 
also holds for the period during and after the financial crisis at medium-sized banks; and for the 
period after the financial crisis at small banks. As suggested by the summary statistics presented 
in table 3, noninterest income at large banks accounts for approximately twice as much as that of 
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medium-sized and small banks. This is because medium-sized and small banks do not have much 
experience in producing noninterest income. In contrast, the economies of scale at large banks 
allow them to enjoy their experience, expertise and technology capabilities of generating 
noninterest income. Additionally, large banks have a higher portion of noninterest income 
indicating that noninterest income is relatively more important for their businesses in comparison 
to medium-sized and small banks. This leads to the result that noninterest income is always 
positively associated with valuations at large banks. 
 
Looking at bank size, the results indicate a negative relation with valuation at large banks for the 
three sub-periods but demonstrate a positive association at medium-sized banks before and after 
the financial crisis. Size is always insignificantly associated with valuation at small banks. The 
complexity to manage large banks is one possible reason. This result is consistent with Laeven 
and Levin (2007) finding that economies of scale are not sufficient enough to yield higher values. 
 
In our paper, return on equity (ROE) is always positively associated with bank valuations 
regardless of the market conditions and bank sizes. As ROE is a performance measurement, the 
higher ROE signals better performance, resulting in higher values. Capital has a positive 
association with bank valuation before the crisis and a negative relation during the crisis for each 
group. After the crisis, there is an insignificant relation at medium-sized and small banks, but a 
negative relation at large banks. 
 
Loans are positively associated with valuations after the crisis at large banks, and are negatively 
associated with valuations during and after the crisis at medium-sized banks and during the crisis 
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at small banks. The possible reason is that large banks enjoy the economies of scale, so they are 
able to recover faster and have a higher capacity to absorb losses; whereas medium-sized and 
small banks much more severely suffer from default and credit risks at the time of the sub-prime 
financial crisis. Deposits are negatively related to valuation after the crisis for large banks, but 
positively related to valuation before the crisis for both medium-sized and small banks. As 
Laeven and Levin (2007) point out, a higher level of deposits allows banks to access to the 
lower-cost funding, because deposits are regarded as a cheaper source of funding and are entitled 
to the government-subsidized insurance. In particular, as the summary statistics in table 3 
suggest, medium-sized and small banks have higher means of deposits to total assets compared 
with large banks, thus these banks benefit more from deposits. 
 
In the Table 8, 9 and 10, we perform robustness checks and use the market-to-book ratio as an 
alternative measure of valuation in order to test the association between noninterest income and 
bank valuations. The results of our regressions are also based on three different market 
conditions and bank sizes. 
 
We find that, for large and small banks, the relation between noninterest income and bank 
valuations is the same as that when we use Tobin’s q as the dependent variable. Capital is 
insignificant before the crisis at large banks, whereas it is positive when we use Tobin’s q as the 
dependent variable. Loans are always insignificant. For the control variable of bank size, the 
results show that small and medium-sized banks benefit from the economies of scale during the 
crisis while there is no such relation when we use Tobin’s q as the dependent variable. 
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For medium-sized banks, the relation between noninterest income and bank valuations is 
insignificant after the financial crisis. Capital is negatively related to valuations before the crisis, 
and loans are negatively associated with valuations before the crisis. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the impact of noninterest income on bank valuations. We perform analyses 
using yearly data on 625 U.S. Bank Holding Companies over the period of 2003 – 2015. 
Looking at the whole sample, we find a positive relation between noninterest income and bank 
valuations.  
 
We perform robustness exams to take a close look at the impact of noninterest income on bank 
valuation under different market conditions. We divide banks into three sub-periods: before, 
during and after the financial crisis of 2007 – 2009. We also divide banks in our sample into 
three groups based on size: large, medium-sized and small banks. We find that noninterest 
income is positively related to valuation (1) for large banks in each sub-period, (2) for medium-
sized banks during and after the financial crisis of 2007-2009, and (3) for small banks after the 
financial crisis.  
 
One of the underlying reasons is that medium-sized and small banks do not have much 
experience in generating noninterest income. In contrast, the economies of scale at large banks 
allow them to enjoy their experience, expertise and technology capabilities of generating 
noninterest income. Large banks have a higher portion of noninterest income indicating that 
noninterest income is relatively more important in their business compared with medium-sized 
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and small banks. Additionally, regulatory changes are one possible reason that affect banks’ 
ability to generate noninterest income. The implementation of Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 makes 
banks more difficult and more expensive to service mortgage loans. The Volcker Rule included 
in the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits banks from generating revenue from proprietary trading and 
limits investment in hedge funds and private equity. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Definition of variables  
Variables Definition 
Tobin’s Q, q The ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of 
liabilities to the book value of assets  
Market-to-book, mb The ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity 
Noninterest income, Nii The ratio of noninterest income to total operating income 
Size The natural logarithm of total assets in thousands of dollars 
Capital The ratio of equity to total assets 
Loans The ratio of net loans to total assets 
Deposits The ratio of total deposits to total assets 
Return on equity, ROE The ratio of pre-tax profit to equity 
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Table 2: Number of banks by year 
 
 
Year N 
2003 454 
2004 438 
2005 448 
2006 376 
2007 355 
2008 339 
2009 345 
2010 329 
2011 290 
2012 279 
2013 226 
2014 234 
2015 195 
Total observations 4,308 
Total number of BHCs 625 
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Table 3: Summary statistics 
Panel A: Summary statistics for large banks 
 
N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
q 687 1.050 1.038 0.078 0.992 1.098 
mb 687 1.552 1.380 0.828 0.928 2.085 
Nii 687 0.315 0.291 0.181 0.199 0.395 
Size 687 17.654 17.173 1.383 16.518 18.492 
Capital 687 0.102 0.100 0.026 0.084 0.116 
Loans 687 0.573 0.635 0.171 0.479 0.688 
Deposits 687 0.665 0.694 0.150 0.610 0.771 
ROE 687 0.127 0.142 0.152 0.084 0.201 
   
 
 
   Panel B: Summary statistics for medium-sized banks 
 
N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
q 2,257 1.044 1.035 0.069 0.993 1.086 
mb 2,257 1.468 1.349 0.784 0.926 1.951 
Nii 2,257 0.176 0.161 0.104 0.113 0.226 
Size 2,257 14.720 14.610 0.636 14.176 15.191 
Capital 2,257 0.096 0.094 0.027 0.079 0.110 
Loans 2,257 0.662 0.675 0.114 0.603 0.738 
Deposits 2,257 0.767 0.785 0.088 0.727 0.823 
ROE 2,257 0.071 0.122 0.238 0.060 0.175 
   
 
 
   Panel C: Summary statistics for small banks 
 
N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
q 1,364 1.036 1.032 0.065 0.985 1.079 
mb 1,364 1.405 1.349 0.742 0.835 1.864 
Nii 1,364 0.149 0.132 0.096 0.089 0.184 
Size 1,364 13.286 13.357 0.380 13.086 13.585 
Capital 1,364 0.093 0.090 0.026 0.077 0.105 
Loans 1,364 0.676 0.687 0.115 0.607 0.761 
Deposits 1,364 0.778 0.795 0.090 0.736 0.839 
ROE 1,364 0.078 0.115 0.206 0.060 0.168 
       
 
Panel D: How noninterest income has changed over time 
  Before Crisis Changes During Crisis Changes After Crisis 
Small Banks 0.154 -18% 0.127 24% 0.158 
Medium Banks 0.173 -10% 0.155 24% 0.192 
Large Banks 0.314 -17% 0.260 32% 0.342 
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Table 4: Regression results of the whole sample,  
   Tobin’s q and Market-to-book ratio are the dependent variables 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Tobin’s q Market-to-book ratio 
   
Nii 0.091*** 0.756*** 
 (0.010) (0.100) 
 
Size 0.003*** 0.051*** 
 (0.001) (0.007) 
 
Capital 0.036 -2.793*** 
 (0.037) (0.368) 
 
Loans -0.005 -0.103 
 (0.009) (0.089) 
 
Deposits 0.054*** 0.669*** 
 (0.013) (0.121) 
 
ROE 0.072*** 1.070*** 
 (0.006) (0.076) 
 
Constant 0.976*** 0.856*** 
 (0.016) (0.154) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 4,308 4,308 
Number of Entity 625 625 
R-squared 0.502 0.550 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Regression results, Tobin’s q is the dependent variable, large banks 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Before the crisis During the crisis After the crisis 
    
Nii 0.146*** 0.145*** 0.110*** 
 (0.035) (0.044) (0.025) 
    
Size -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.019*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
    
Capital 0.794*** -0.925*** -0.280** 
 (0.139) (0.151) (0.136) 
    
Loans -0.011 -0.007 0.054** 
 (0.025) (0.034) (0.025) 
    
Deposits 0.021 -0.010 -0.087*** 
 (0.033) (0.063) (0.022) 
    
ROE 0.424*** 0.116*** 0.377*** 
 (0.062) (0.019) (0.069) 
    
Constant 1.121*** 1.314*** 1.352*** 
 (0.055) (0.086) (0.052) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 222 155 310 
Number of Entity 70 60 67 
R-squared 0.636 0.571 0.622 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: We divide the sample into three periods: before the crisis (2003 – 2006), during the crisis 
(2007 – 2009) and after the crisis (2010 – 2015). Large banks have total assets exceeding US$10 
billion. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.   
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Table 6: Regression results, Tobin’s q is the dependent variable, medium-sized banks 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Before the crisis During the crisis After the crisis 
    
Nii 0.046 0.237*** 0.036** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.017) 
    
Size 0.010*** 0.005 0.019*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
    
Capital 0.320** -0.248*** 0.066 
 (0.126) (0.079) (0.065) 
    
Loans -0.027 -0.047* -0.033* 
 (0.017) (0.027) (0.019) 
    
Deposits 0.097*** -0.028 0.028 
 (0.025) (0.034) (0.030) 
    
ROE 0.283*** 0.043*** 0.051*** 
 (0.089) (0.008) (0.012) 
    
Constant 0.812*** 0.991*** 0.712*** 
 (0.045) (0.061) (0.054) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 754 591 912 
Number of Entity 248 228 244 
R-squared 0.308 0.386 0.284 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: We divide the sample into three periods: before the crisis (2003 – 2006), during the crisis 
(2007 – 2009) and after the crisis (2010 – 2015). Medium-sized banks have total assets between 
US$1 billion and US$10 billion. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, 
respectively.   
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Table 7: Regression results, Tobin’s q is the dependent variable, small banks 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Before the crisis During the crisis After the crisis 
    
Nii -0.018 0.076 0.033* 
 (0.023) (0.048) (0.017) 
    
Size 0.001 0.014 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.009) 
    
Capital 0.320*** -0.225** 0.019 
 (0.092) (0.095) (0.112) 
    
Loans 0.008 -0.091*** 0.018 
 (0.014) (0.028) (0.024) 
    
Deposits 0.147*** 0.052 0.012 
 (0.026) (0.047) (0.031) 
    
ROE 0.291*** 0.039*** 0.022* 
 (0.045) (0.008) (0.012) 
    
Constant 0.884*** 0.875*** 0.977*** 
 (0.057) (0.145) (0.120) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 740 293 331 
Number of Entity 266 137 119 
R-squared 0.337 0.333 0.220 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: We divide the sample into three periods: before the crisis (2003 – 2006), during the crisis 
(2007 – 2009) and after the crisis (2010 – 2015). Small banks have total assets up to US$1 
billion. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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Table 8: Regression results, Market-to-book ratio is the dependent variable, large banks 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Before the crisis During the crisis After the crisis 
    
Nii 1.497*** 1.657*** 0.939*** 
 (0.412) (0.450) (0.234) 
    
Size -0.129*** -0.127*** -0.179*** 
 (0.026) (0.034) (0.019) 
    
Capital -2.200 -8.723*** -5.142*** 
 (1.383) (1.704) (1.278) 
    
Loans -0.327 -0.252 0.343 
 (0.302) (0.377) (0.255) 
    
Deposits 0.514 0.348 -0.644*** 
 (0.391) (0.644) (0.226) 
    
ROE 5.220*** 1.417*** 3.672*** 
 (0.745) (0.201) (0.598) 
    
Constant 2.994*** 3.876*** 4.634*** 
 (0.605) (0.890) (0.501) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 222 155 310 
Number of Entity 70 60 67 
R-squared 0.610 0.599 0.614 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: We divide the sample into three periods: before the crisis (2003 – 2006), during the crisis 
(2007 – 2009) and after the crisis (2010 – 2015). Large banks have total assets exceeding US$10 
billion. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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Table 9: Regression results, Market-to-book ratio is the dependent variable, medium-sized banks 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Before the crisis During the crisis After the crisis 
    
Nii 0.462 1.857*** 0.185 
 (0.369) (0.310) (0.153) 
    
Size 0.113*** 0.109*** 0.192*** 
 (0.035) (0.037) (0.026) 
    
Capital -4.953*** -3.459*** 0.326 
 (1.557) (0.917) (0.740) 
    
Loans -0.425** -0.460 -0.178 
 (0.210) (0.290) (0.175) 
    
Deposits 0.881*** 0.262 0.306 
 (0.328) (0.369) (0.263) 
    
ROE 3.160*** 0.798*** 0.569*** 
 (1.196) (0.092) (0.177) 
    
Constant -0.058 -0.134 -2.011*** 
 (0.555) (0.604) (0.474) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 754 591 912 
Number of Entity 248 228 244 
R-squared 0.325 0.392 0.263 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: We divide the sample into three periods: before the crisis (2003 – 2006), during the crisis 
(2007 – 2009) and after the crisis (2010 – 2015). Medium-sized banks have total assets between 
US$1 billion and US$10 billion. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, 
respectively.   
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Table 10: Regression results, Market-to-book ratio is the dependent variable, small banks 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Before the crisis During the crisis After the crisis 
    
Nii -0.130 0.665 0.385** 
 (0.253) (0.428) (0.176) 
    
Size -0.028 0.212* -0.012 
 (0.047) (0.124) (0.088) 
    
Capital -3.812*** -0.524 1.898*** 
 (0.883) (1.064) (0.713) 
    
Loans 0.183 -0.955*** -0.080 
 (0.145) (0.290) (0.196) 
    
Deposits 1.395*** 0.676 0.376 
 (0.236) (0.461) (0.303) 
    
ROE 3.347*** 0.478*** 0.323** 
 (0.485) (0.164) (0.155) 
    
Constant 0.960 -1.462 0.408 
 (0.625) (1.635) (1.161) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 740 293 331 
Number of Entity 266 137 119 
R-squared 0.385 0.345 0.311 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: We divide the sample into three periods: before the crisis (2003 – 2006), during the crisis 
(2007 – 2009) and after the crisis (2010 – 2015). Small banks have total assets up to US$1 
billion. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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